We also provide insights into changes in web spam since the last Webb Spam Corpus was released in 2006. These insights include: 1) spammers manipulate social media in spreading spam; 2) HTTP headers also change over time (e.g. hosting IP addresses of web spam appear in more IP ranges); 3) Web spam content has evolved but the majority of content is still scam.
I. I NTRODUCT ION
Web spam is defined as web pages that are created to manipulate search engines and deceive web users [3] , [4] . Email has long been the primary method to spread web spam, although spammers are evolving with the times and quickly employing new techniques to spread web spam. One clear trend is the move towards social media due to the ease of sharing information providing more efficient and numerous channels for the growth of web spam. For example, web spam links in friend requests, inbox messages, and news feeds, are redirecting users to advertisement web sites or other types of malicious web sites. Further, social media sites have redefined the way links are shared with a tendency to share links using URL shorteners [5] .
Apart from evolution of web and applications on the web being one of the reasons driving change in web spam, there is a constant evolution of spam as a reaction to defensive techniques introduced by researchers [6] , [7] . Improvements in defensive techniques used in web spam are enabled by researchers having access to corpora of web spam and being able to collaborate on developing and reporting results on web spam filtering techniques.
In this paper we introduce the Webb Spam Corpus 2011, a new corpus of approximately 330,000 spam web pages. We compare this corpus with the previous, and first of its kind, web spam corpus [7] released in 2006. More concretely, we make the following contributions:
First, we create a new large-scale Web spam corpus -Webb Spam Corpus 2011 -which is a collection of approximately 330,000 spam web pages. Web spam links are extracted from spam email messages received between May 2010 to November 2010. Additionally, we also perform data cleansing to remove legitimate pages which may have been inadvertently collected (similar to the data cleansing performed in the prior Webb Spam Corpus by Webb et al. [8] ).
Second, we analyze the Webb Spam Corpus 2011 from various perspectives. For example, we evaluate the new corpus on three main aspects: redirections, HTTP session information and content. Based on these aspects, we also make insightful observations. For example, when investigating legitimate web link attack in data cleansing, we found that social networks and search engines have become major targets of attacks.
Lastly, we studied the evolution of web spam by comparing Webb Spam Corpus 2011 with Webb Spam Corpus 2006. For redirections, Webb Spam Corpus 2011 has less redirection. Specifically, it has less "302 Found" redirections and location redirection but more iframe redirections. The host names in redirection chains have new category -social networks sites, which indicates that social media have been manipulated to spread Web spam through hosting profiles, like plug-ins, and widgets. For HTTP session information, the percentages of hosting IP addresses for web spam in the ranges of 63.* -69.* and 204.* -216.* have changed from 45.4% and 38.6% in Webb Spam Corpus to 28.1 % and 21.7% respectively. Addi tionally, we compared the top 10 HTTP headers in the datasets. In terms of content, there are few exact content duplications between the datasets. We also compared the contents of the data sets from other content aspects: most popular words, top words based on information gain, and n-gram(n is from 2 to 3) sequences based on frequency.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We motivate the problem further in Section II. Section III in troduces corpus including the data collection and cleansing methods. Section IV compares W91'� 1��:f fi916 � -�W-f� 1�H �ktP
Webb Spam Corpus. We discuss related work in Section V and conclude the paper in Section VI.
II. M OT IVAT ION
Web spam has received a lot of attention with search engines constantly adjusting techniques to identify web spam [9] and social networks trying to prevent web spam propagating through their networks [10] . With web links being one of the most popular and easiest ways to share information on the web, web spam will remain a problem.
One of the most common technique to fight web spam is using machine learning, more specifically supervised learning techniques, to build classifiers for web spam using headers, content, or link features. As a prerequisite to using such techniques or researching new ones, having access to a large amount of labeled web spam is important and thus we collect, cleanse, and release a corpus of web spam as an enabler for researchers to improve and develop new web spam techniques. A standard corpus released for any number of researchers to use, as is the case with our corpus, allows and encourages collaboration between researchers to share and improve on each others results.
Although the release of the previous Webb Spam Corpus achieved this a number of years ago, we found that web spam has changed significantly enough to warrant an update to the Webb Spam Corpus. Namely, as detection techniques improve, spammers evolve and introduce new techniques to avoid detection. A concrete example of this is popular tools such as URL shorteners (which reduce the length of a URL by mapping an identifier on a standard web link to a long URL) were quickly picked-up by spammers as a cheap method of obfuscation and redirection. 2) Source URL and Actual URL: We distinguish URL links into two groups: source URLs and actual URLs. Here, source URLs are the original URLs extracted from email messages and are typically what the end user will see in the email message. Actual URLs are the final URLs or the URL of the web page that the user finally sees in their browsers. That is, this is the final URL after all redirects (http redirects, javascript redirects, meta-tag redirects, and more) have been followed. If a web page does not redirect a user, the actual URL could be the same as the source URL. To clarify this, the relationship between source URL and actual URL is shown in Figure 2 The relationship between source URL and actual URL has the following characteristics: a). One redirection chain leads from source URL to actual URL; b). Many source URLs may redirect/map to a single actual URL; c). Source URLs which were successfully accessed without resulting in a redirect is actual URL.
3) Source URL links: We start with a set of source URLs extracted from 6.3 million spam emails collected between May 2010 to November 2010 to a moderately sized email service provider. We only extract http and https URLs (al though https links make up only 0.2% of all the spam links we extracted), using Perl's URI::Find::Schemeless and Htrnl: :LinkExtor modules to extract URLs from text and HTML respectively. We end up with 30.7 million web links (15.1 million unique links). Figure 3 shows the distribution of URL links in months. We also investigate the top level domains in source URLs and list top 10 TLDs in Table I URLs, we proceed to download all the web pages. We use a custom crawler written using Perl's LWP::Parallel::UserAgent module to download corresponding web pages. We then follow any iFrame-redirects, http-redirects, javascript redirects (using Mozilla's Rhino), or meta-tag redirects. More details can be found in [7] which uses similar techniques. We keep the raw headers and HTML content of the page, and do not crawl or spider links from it. We downloaded a total of 1.7 million pages (including redirections) and in-total collected over 1 GB of data. Besides legitimate URL links in spam emails, the down loaded web pages also contain other false-positives. Although these actual URLs may have been spam URLs, due to the delay in setting up our downloading and cleansing system, the spam URLs were crawled a few months after the source URLs were extracted. This resulted in a number of 404 HTTP errors or custom served "404 error web pages".
We eliminate such pages as well as previously mentioned false-positives leaving us with 673,489 spam web pages in the corpus.
2) Removing Non-Textual Web Pages: Approximately 98%
of web pages identify their "Content-type" as textlhtml. After cleansing false-positives in corpus, we discard non textlhtml pages. By removing non-textual web pages based on the attribute "Content-Type" in HTTP header information, we kept 673,313 web pages including 342,478 redirections.
C. Data Statistics
After finishing downloading all web pages, we investigate the distribution of top level domains and HTTP status codes. The purpose is to find which top level domain hosts the most web spam and the most common HTTP responses when we click through those spam URL links.
To obtain popular top level domains, we process the dataset in the following steps. First, we collect all top level domains from lANA Data\ which contains 313 top level domains (last updated Jun 20, 2012 ) . By matching all the source URLs in downloaded files with the top level domains list, we aggregated the count of web pages in the same top level domain. The 10 most popular top level domains are shown in Figure 5 . We see that the three most popular top level domains COM, ORG, and NET almost represent more than 80% of the TLDs. Especially, the percentage of web pages which are belonging to top level domain COM is over 60%. Number of Redirects 
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Number of source URLs mapping to a single actual URL (Log Scale) Fig. 8 . Distribution of the number of source URLs that point to the same actual URL
Redirections have different categories including HTTP redi rect, frame redirect, iFrame redirect, meta-refresh redirect and location redirect [8] . For HTTP redirect, it also has some subcategories based on response status such as "301 Moved" HTTP redirect and "302 Found" HTTP redirect. We compare the redirection distribution of two data sets which is shown in Figure 9 . Figure 9 shows HTTP redirect in Webb Spam Corpus 2011 still occupies the majority of redirections, accounting for 4l.7% of the redirections (25.6% for "Found" redirects, 12.1 % for "Moved Permanently" redirects, and 4.0% for other HTTP redirects). HTML frame and HTML iFrame redirects account for 14.8% and 28.4% respectively. Redirection using meta refresh tags account for 15.0% and location redirect accounts for less than 1 % of all redirects.
We observe that Webb Spam Corpus 2011 has fewer "302
Found" redirections and location redirection. But it has more iFrame redirections. Meanwhile, we found that Webb Spam
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Corpus 2011 has other HTTP redirects which occupies 4%
redirections. The response status examples of other HTTP redirects includes: a) "302 Object moved"; b) "302 Moved Temporarily"; c) "302 Redirect".
Besides showing the distribution of redirections, we also look into the common host names in redirection chains which will tell us what kinds of websites have been taken advantage of by the spammers. The most common host names in redi rection chains including HTTP redirection, frame redirection, iFrame redirection, and meta-refresh redirection are shown in Table III . From Table III , we investigated all the host names and found that there are three major categories: domain parking websites, social networks websites, and advertiser websites. For example, bodisparking.com and sedoparking.com are do main parking websites. facebook.com and in.com are social networks websites. ad.doubleclick.net is advertiser websites. The first set of counts represent the view of all of the HTTP, HTML, and JavaScript redirection techniques. This list con sists of 3 domain parking services, 1 advertiser, and 1 social networks. The top 5 HTTP redirect host names consist of 1 domain parking service, 3 advertisers and 1 social networks. The top 5 frame redirect host names consist of 3 domain parking services, 2 advertisers. The top 5 iframe redirect host names consist of 1 domain parking services, 3 advertisers, and 1 social networks. The top 5 meta refresh redirect host names consist of 3 domain parking services, 1 advertiser, and 1 social networks.
Domain parking for idle domains is used to display ad vertisements and earn money. It is easy to understand that spammers are using these domains for monetary benefit. Advertisers are similar to domain parking services on dis playing advertisements which may not be useful for users . For social networks websites, we studied in detail about Facebook URLs in Webb Spam Corpus 201 l. We found that the majority of redirections from Facebook belongs to iFrame redirection, meta-refresh redirection and HTTP redirection. In iFrame redirection, there are three types of URL redirections based on the sub path of URL links: "connect", "plugins", and "widgets", which accounts for 72.6%, 24.4%, and 3% respectively. Also the "connect" URL link redirects users to the profiles hosted Facebook. In our dataset, lO,820 "connect" URL link redirects to "t35.com" profile hosting in Facebook. "t35.com" is a domain parking services website. For 3,655 "plugins" URL links, 3,379 of them are "like" box plugin and 140 of them are "activity" plugin. Normally, if you click on "like" box plugin, you will become a fan of events, products, or profiles so that you will be kept updated with news feeds and status changes. For "activity" plugin, you will join the activity if you click on it. "Widgets" URL links are similar to "plugins" URL links. 444 "widgets" URL links provide "like" button for users to click. Therefore, we can conclude that spammers are using the power of social networks to spread spam information.
B. HTTP Session Information
Webb Spam Corpus 2011 also contains the HTTP session information that was obtained from the servers that were hosting those pages. In this section, we compare two data sets focusing on the most common server IP addresses and session header values.
1) Hosting IP Addresses: Hosting IP address is the IP address that hosts a given web spam page. Figure lO shows the distribution of all of the hosting IP addresses over network number in Webb Spam Corpus 201 l. Here network number is the first 8 bits of IPV 4 address. Previous study [8] Table IV shows 4 IP addresses from 63.* -69.*, 2 IP addresses from 204.* -216.*, and 4 IP addresses from other ranges. Also, it shows that 4 IP addresses from US servers, 2 IP addresses from France servers, and 4 IP addresses from other countries (Australia, Korea, Netherlands, and Germany).
We can see that all servers are legitimate servers which doesn't mean those legitimate servers are the spanuners. It only means the web services provided by those servers are used by the spammers for the spamming purpose.
2) HTTP Session Header: Previous study [11] has shown that HTTP session information is used for predict web spam efficiently. As the evolution of web spam, we intend to see whether HTTP session information of web spam has changed over time. To obtain most popular HTTP session information, we rank out top 10 HTTP session headers based on the count of web spam which those headers are associated with, shown in Table V. Compared with top lO HTTP session headers, Table V shows some changes as follows: a). new header P3P appears in top lO list and old header PRAGMA has been removed from the list; b) the most popular values for the header SERVER and CONTENT-LENGTH have changed from "microsoft iis/6.0" to "Apache" and from 1,470 to 77 respectively; c). the order of the header CONTENT-LENGTH moves before X-POW ERED-BY but the others keep the same relative order. Also, we find that 79.1 % of the web spam pages with a SERVER header were hosted by "Apache" (60.5%) or "Mi crosoft lIS" (18.6%). In Webb Spam Corpus, 94.2% of the web spam pages with a SERVER header were hosted by "Apache" (63.9%) or "Microsoft lIS" (30.3%). Most popular value for the header CONTENT-LENGTH is not able to show the trend of content length so we also obtain the distribution of content length shown in Figure 11 . Figure 11 shows the average value of content-length is between 1,000 and 1,0000 although the most popular value is 77 bytes. As more multimedia used in web spam, the content length of web spam text gradually becomes shorter. Another thing we also need to check is whether the content of web spam also evolve over time. 
2) Syntax Analysis:
We analyze syntax of Webb Spam Corpus 2011 by computing the information gain of words in the content of web pages. Information gain, which is also called Kullback-Leibler divergence [12] in information theory, is calculated based on entropy as follows:
In this section, we compare two data sets on duplications and syntax changes between them. For duplications, we try to find the overlap between them based on MD5 hash values of content of web spam. For syntax changes, we intend to obtain the evolution of web spam syntax by comparing information gain of words and n-gram phrases.
Here, T denotes a set of training examples and a presents the ath attribute of instance. H ( T) is the entropy ofT and H ( Tl a )
is the conditional entropy of T with knowing the value of a.
Taking every web page as document, we adopt a bag of words model [13] to generate document instances in binary features. First, we need to tokenize the documents. Tokeniza tion is the process of splitting the document up into words, phrases, symbols, or other meaningful elements called tokens Figure 12 shows that some words in the top 20 list appear less than in Webb Spam Corpus 2011 such as "free", "web", "home", "search", and "software". Some words appear more frequently than in Webb Spam Corpus 2011 such as "informa tion", "online", "internet" and "price". It indicates the trend of spammy words and changes over time.
Besides most popular words, we also look into the discrim inative words which distinguish two datasets. We ranked them by the value of their information gain according to the formula and used different labels to mark the instances in two datasets. The result of top 10 words based on information gain is shown in Figure 13 . Figure 13 shows top 10 words based on information gain. We further found that all words except "play list" appear in Webb Spam Corpus 2006 while only four words including "playlist" , "vault", "cio", and "advertisement" present in Webb Spam Corpus 2011. Since we transformed all words into lower case format, words such as "cio" and "itworld" should be "CIO" and "ITworld". Word "play list" normally appears in multimedia section of social media. For example, user profile has the embedded radio player which has a play list for visitors.
Moreover, we compared n-gram (n is from 2 to 3) se quences in the two datasets. After using Perl's Text::Ngrams [7] introduced the first large-scale dataset -the Webb Spam Corpus which is a collection of approximately 330,000 web spam pages. It addressed the challenge of the lack of publicly available corpora in previous Web spam research [14] , [15] , [16] , [17] , [18] . Further, they conducted intensive experimental study of web spam through content and HTTP session analysis on it [8] . They categorized Web spam into five groups: Ad Farms, Parked Domains, Advertisements, Pornography, and Redirection. Besides, they performed HTTP session analysis and obtained several interesting findings. After that, Webb et al. [11] presented a predicative approach to Web spam classification using HTTP session information (i.e., hosting IP addresses and HTTP session headers). They found that HTTP session classifier effectively detected 88.2% of the Web spam pages with Iow a false positive rate 0.4%. Our work is to further experimental study on evolution of web spam through content and HTTP session analysis on new Webb Spam Corpus. By comparing the two large-scale datasets in different time ranges, we obtained the trend of Web spam and behavior changes of spammers.
Fetterly et al. [19] presented their work on a large-scale study of the evolution of web pages through measuring the rate and degree of web page changes over a significant period is just a 26,016 of change of different classes of pages. Yo ungjoo Chung [6] studied the evolution and emergence of web spam in three yearly large-scale of Japanese Web archives which contains 83 million links. His work focus on the evolution of web spam based on sizes, topics and hostnames of link farms, including hijacked sites which are continuously attacked by spammers and spam link generators which will generate link to spam pages in the future. Irani et al. [20] studied the evolution of phishing email messages and they classified phishing messages into flash attacks and non-flash attacks and analyzed transitory features and pervasive features. In our paper, we also studied the evolution of web spam but there are two important ways which are different from his work: First, we focus on redirection techniques, HTTP session information and content not link farms. Second, the majority of the data sets we study on is in English language not in Japanese. It may have common features between them but our datasets are more representative than his dataset in terms of the popularity of web spam in English language.
In previous research, we proposed a social spam detection framework for social networks [21] . We studied three popular objects in social networks including profile, message, and web page objects. The classification of web page model shows promising results for associative learning.
We collected new web spam corpus and studied the evo lution of web spam. Our work addresses the lack of publicly available dataset for research and also shows the trend of web spam in social media.
VI. C ONCLUSIONS
We introduced new large-scale web spam corpus -Webb Spam Corpus 2011 which is a collection of approximately 330,000 web spam pages. Adopting the automatic web spam collection method [7] , we crawled the Internet through more than one million URL links in spam email messages during for the 70, 177 Price (N) Retail
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the time range between May 2010 and November 2010. In data cleansing of new dataset, we found that legitimate URL attacks by spammers are using more URLs in social media and search engine domains.
In addition to introducing new dataset, we also performed intensive study on Webb Spam Corpus 2011 through redirec tion, HTTP session analysis, and content. In redirection analy sis, we found that less redirections in Webb Spam Corpus 2011 (about 70% source URLs returning no redirection). Another observation is Webb Spam Corpus 2011 has less 302 "Found" redirections and location redirection but it has more iframe redirections. Also Webb Spam Corpus has 4% redirections which are other types of HTTP redirections. For most common host names in redirection chains, we obtained a interesting finding that social networks are used for hosting web profile spam and the widgets and plugins of social networks become convenient spamming traps to attract click traffic. Furthermore, we investigated the HTTP session information of Web spam in Webb Spam Corpus 2011. For hosting IP addresses, the percentages of IP addresses in ranges 63.* -69.* and 204.* -216.* have been reduced from 45.4% to 28.1% and from 38.6% to 21.7% respectively. For HTTP session headers, new header P3P appears in top 10 list and old header PRAGMA has been removed from the list. The most popular values for the header SERVER and CONTENT-LENGTH have changed from "microsoft-iis/6.0" to "Apache" and from 1,470 to 77 respectively. Also we generated the distribution of content length of Web spam and found the content length of web spam text gradually becomes shorter. 
